This paper explores a question for the theory that well-being consists in desire satisfaction: can you be made better off by forming new desires and having these desires satisfied, or only by having your existing desires satisfied? I argue that several interpretations of the latter view come with serious costs.

Will people always have opportunities to make valuable contributions to the world? I argue that there are three interestingly different, and at least initially plausible, reasons to worry that they might not.

We argue that attitude theorists must either accept that people with identical experiences can have radically different levels of pleasure, or else give up their main objection to the main rival theory.

In this paper, I show how the paradox of hedonism presents a challenge to a variety of theories of well-being, and how these theories can escape it.

This paper develops a theory on which the paradox of hedonism is not just an empirical accident, but rather a consequence of the nature of pleasure itself.