Will people always have opportunities to make valuable contributions to the world? I argue that there are three interestingly different, and at least initially plausible, reasons to worry that they might not.
We argue that attitudinal theorists must either accept that people with identical experiences can have radically different levels of pleasure, or else give up their main objection to the main rival theory.
In this paper, I show how the so-called paradox of hedonism presents a challenge to a variety of theories of well-being, and how these theories can escape it.
Another paper on the paradox of hedonism. This paper develops a theory of what might explain this phenomenon, according to which the paradox is not just an empirical accident, but rather a consequence of the nature of pleasure itself.
This paper is about the idea that what you ought to do can be affected by the larger patterns of action in which you might be taking part. Specifically, the paper discusses how putting too much weight on this idea can lead to disastrous consequences.
This paper discusses a certain kind of conflict that can arise between what you ought to do as an individual, and what we ought to do as a group.
This paper discusses ethical issues arising from the idea that a person’s so-called temporal parts (such as “me-in-my-twenties”) might be thought of as agents in their own right.
This paper explores a prominent critique of the effective altruism (EA) movement, according to which EA fails to acknowledge the importance of institutional change.
This paper defends the idea that ethical obligations can apply to groups of people, not only to individuals, and discusses how these collective obligations might bear on what individuals ought to do.