I am a Ph.D. candidate in the Philosophy Department at the University of Southern California. From April to June, I will also be a research visitor at the Global Priorities Institute at the University of Oxford. My main interests are in normative ethics and moral psychology.
You can email me at firstname.lastname@example.org.
You can find my CV here.
Explaining the Paradox of Hedonism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming.
What We Together Ought to Do. Ethics, 126 (2016): 955-982.
Effective Altruism and Collective Obligations. Utilitas, forthcoming.
Review of Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5, ed. Mark Timmons. Journal of Moral Philosophy, forthcoming.
Work in Progress
My dissertation explores the question of which units of agency should be of relevance to ethics. I argue that obligations and normative reasons for action are possessed not only by individual persons, but also by larger units, namely groups, and by smaller units, namely the temporal parts of persons. I also defend views about how obligations and reasons for action possessed at different units of agency interact: for example, about when I have reason to do my part in what the group ought to do, and about whether there can be irresolvable conflicts between individual and collective obligations.
Feel free to email me for drafts of any of my work.